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Abstract
This chapter aims to review prior literature on tax practitioner and provides insights 
into tax practitioner behavior that affects taxpayer compliance. For the end, I attempt 
to distinguish tax practitioner compliance from taxpayer compliance for a better under-
standing of tax compliance process. I maintain that tax practitioner compliance can be 
assessed in the light of tax compliance, bringing about new perspective on tax compli-
ance literature. In order for them to ensure compliance, the tax practitioners continue to 
develop their professional skills. Furthermore, the tax practitioner should be responsive 
to the environment in terms of both what clients want and what tax laws allow. However, 
their ethical judgments based on professional proficiency should not be affected by client 
pressure. Being a constituent of tax compliance dynamics, tax practitioner compliance 
may as well be construed in their decisions as well as underlying attitudes toward clients, 
colleagues, and the tax system. As a service provider, the tax practitioner must strive to 
reduce inconsistencies between expectations and experiences. As a member of the profes-
sions, the tax practitioner refrains from abusive tax schemes that can stimulate institu-
tional corruptions. As a professional, the tax practitioner should safeguard the integrity 
of the tax system.
Keywords: tax compliance, tax avoidance, tax practitioners, self-assessment tax system
1. Introduction
This chapter aims to review prior literature on tax practitioner and provide insights into tax 
practitioner behavior that affects taxpayer compliance. For the last four decades, tax compli-
ance has been a subject matter of considerable interest to many researchers from a variety 
of academic disciplines including accounting, economics, history, law, psychology, political 
science, and sociology [1]. A great deal of studies has already contributed to the tax literature 
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discovering factors that shape taxpayer compliance behavior. However, most of them focus 
on taxpayer’s behavioral responses to the tax system and fiscal policy.
Taxation is a highly structured process of institutionalized entities like taxpayers, tax practi-
tioners, tax administration, and up to government and tax lawmakers [2]. Besides, tax compli-
ance is a complex phenomenon in the actors in the field, and their interactions have a great 
impact on individual taxpayers’ behavior [3]. Hence, lack of research on important entities can 
undermine our understanding of tax compliance behavior that is intimately intertwined [4].
In the real world, professional tax practices are highly relevant to determine taxpayer com-
pliance. Tax practitioner can exert considerable influence on taxpayers in the tax compliance 
process by either helping them to enforce or exploit the tax law [5]. Many taxpayers, being 
helpless of overwhelming volumes and mysterious jargons in the tax laws, resort to the 
assistance from tax professionals who are well-informed of the complex tax rules. Moreover, 
having limited resources to run their business, taxpayers often defer to tax practitioners for 
the important decisions about their own tax matters. Therefore, it is essential to understand 
what makes the practitioners compliant and how they achieve compliance in taxpayer com-
pliance process. However, scientific studies on tax practice in relation to taxpayer compli-
ance are scarce. Furthermore, there is not a widely accepted definition of tax practitioner 
compliance.
The main objective of the chapter is to provide tax scholars, tax practitioners, and tax authori-
ties with a better understanding of tax practitioner compliance in connection with taxpayers’ 
choice of their tax position. Toward this end, I glean useful knowledge from research findings 
and synthesize them in order to clarify the meaning of tax compliance in relation to taxpayer 
and tax practitioner and their interactions. Herein, I refer to tax practitioners as private sector 
tax professionals who help taxpayers to prepare their tax returns and/or provide advice on tax 
matters including accountants, paid preparers, lawyers, etc.
Tax practitioner behavior is of great concern to taxpayers, as well as tax authorities. Shafer 
and Simmons [6] maintain tax advisors have abandoned concern for the public interests in 
favor of commercialism. The dilemma mainly arises from their dual role as a client advocate 
and gatekeeper safeguarding the fairness of the tax system. In other words, an aspect of tax 
practitioner compliance relates to the conflict of client advocacy and professional responsi-
bilities [7]. Mason and Garrett Levy [8], p. 127, defines client advocacy as “a state of mind in 
which one feels one’s primary loyalty belongs to the taxpayer. It is exhibited by a desire to 
represent the taxpayer zealously within the bounds of the law and by a desire to be a fighter 
on behalf of the taxpayer.”
For example, a noncompliant practitioner is willing to accept overly aggressive or, in its 
extreme, a fraudulent tax reporting if the probability of detection and punishment is per-
ceived to be relatively low. However, an important question still remains unresolved. Should 
tax practitioner aggressiveness in terms of recommending tax treatment be deemed noncom-
pliant without any consideration whatsoever? Is tax practitioner compliance achieved if the 
practitioner takes too conservative a tax position in favor of the government which, arguably, 
represents public interests?
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This chapter attempts to discover the key to understand the puzzling concept of tax practi-
tioner compliance by illuminating the role of tax practitioners in the self-assessment system 
(“SAS”) in regard to income tax return reporting positions. Since most of prior studies pre-
dominantly investigate tax compliance in the frame of individual taxpayers’ evasion decision 
under detection risk, the term tax compliance and taxpayer compliance are often used inter-
changeably. For the purpose of the article, however, tax compliance should be carefully distin-
guished from taxpayer compliance. I presume that the tax compliance refers to ex-ante process, 
rather than ex-post consequence of the declaration of tax liabilities, in which all the actors in the 
field are involved to maintain. In a similar vein, Boll [9] argues that tax compliance is a socio-
material assemblage, and complying is a distributed action among actors in the tax system.
2. The conceptualization of tax compliances
Taxpayer noncompliance refers to any failure to meet tax obligations, and it does not neces-
sarily require intention to pay less tax than the law demands. It may result from deliberate 
underreporting, inadvertent misreporting, or nonfiling of tax return. The tax gap, which is a 
popular measure of noncompliance in an aggregate level, is defined as the difference between 
actual tax collected and the potential tax collection under full compliance [10]. It consists of 
nonfiling, underreporting, and underpayment of tax [11], which represent filing noncompli-
ance, reporting noncompliance, and payment noncompliance, respectively.
Tax evasion and tax avoidance consist in deliberate act of noncompliance. While tax evasion 
refers to intentional underpayment of taxes by deliberate nondisclosure of taxable resources 
[12], tax avoidance is widely considered a legal way of reducing tax dues. Tax avoidance, 
however, is often against the spirit of the laws, thereby has a chance to be challenged by tax 
authorities, which eventually falls under the category of noncompliance.
The majority of scientific studies on tax compliance address the problem of individuals’ tax 
evasion decision in the form of underreporting taxable income or overclaiming unwarranted 
deductions. In particular, most of them are concerned with SAS, in which taxpayers are given 
opportunities to underreport, and their initial tax liabilities are determined by self-declaration, 
while the true income will not be observable by tax authorities unless a tax audit is conducted. 
Thus, tax noncompliance, in the narrowest sense, refers to taxpayers’ dishonesty in their tax 
reporting.
However, it should be noted that, from the viewpoint of taxpayers, noncompliance problem 
lies not only in undercompliance but also in overcompliance: noncompliance can result not 
only from underreporting or underpayment but also from overreporting or overpayment. 
Inadvertent noncompliance may result from the errors and mistakes of taxpayers or tax prac-
titioners. Nevertheless, the researchers and policymakers have paid little attention to the prob-
lem of overcompliance. It may be that taxpayers are assumed to be rational enough to deal 
with tax matters, and thus, discovering of underreporting should be deemed the consequence 
of their intentional misconduct. On the basis of rationality assumptions, any mistakes may be 




Tax laws are increasingly voluminous, and the law provisions are sometimes terribly compli-
cated to be fully understood. It takes a lot of time and effort to meet the tax obligations, and 
even if they pay much attention enough to avoid inadvertent errors and mistakes, tax liabili-
ties are often subject to uncertainty from varying interpretations of ambiguous tax situations. 
For a further understanding, the following section discusses the issues of tax law complexity 
and ambiguity.
3. Tax law complexity and ambiguity
In practice, many taxpayers are faced with the complexity of tax laws and the uncertainty 
of enforcement. In most developed countries, tax law is complex, and it requires a very high 
reading age to be correctly understood [14]. Taxation cost (taxes and compliance cost) is per-
ceived to be much more painful loss for small business taxpayers because they lack sufficient 
resources to manage their business [15].
If tax laws are vague and complicated, it may be difficult to fully comply with the law even 
with no intention to evade. Owing to the complex nature, ordinary taxpayers cannot cope well 
with tax requirements. Sakurai and Braithwaite [16] showed that the most important reason 
that their survey respondents gave for using tax service was that the desire to avoid the risk of 
potential tax penalties resulting from inaccurate tax returns. The professional tax knowledge 
that prevents the taxpayer from unintentional overpayment as well as underpayment can be 
purchased from the tax practitioners. Thus, an aspect of tax practitioner compliance can be bet-
ter construed in connection with professional competence that ensures correct tax reporting.
McKerchar [17] maintains that tax complexity is a double edge sword for practitioners: on one 
side, it induces taxpayers into the arms of practitioners facilitating the market for tax service; 
but sometimes, it is too much a burden even for them to juggle. Although compliance duties 
can be addressed more correctly by the tax practitioner, the assistance of the tax practitioner 
cannot eliminate the risk of inadvertent noncompliance due to the complexity inherent in 
the law.
Carnes and Cuccia [18] argue that complexity is a source of unintentional noncompliance, 
and it may represent opportunities for intentional noncompliance as well. More often, tax 
practitioners can only reduce the uncertainty by assessing the likelihood a tax treatment will 
be sustained on its merits [19]. That said, inadvertent noncompliance is in part attributable 
to tax law ambiguity. A tax situation is ambiguous if its proper tax treatment is not ex-ante 
deterministic. Aggressive tax treatment involves a reasonable probability that the reporting 
position will not be upheld in a tax audit [20]. Aggressive tax practitioners are more likely to 
interpret the ambiguous tax situation to the benefit of their clients.
Studies on tax practitioner behavior attempt to discover the conditions in which tax advisors 
would recommend more aggressive reporting position [21]. A number of studies have been 
conducted investigating factors that impact tax practitioners’ willingness to accept aggressive 
reporting positions; among them are attitude toward risk [22], the threat of penalties [23], and 
client’s risk preference [24]. In particular, Prospect theory [25] may also serve as a theoretical 
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basis to explain tax practitioner’s behavior. According to the Prospect theory, people exhibit 
risk seeking tendency in a loss situation, while being risk averse in a gain situation. Newberry 
et al. [26] found that CAPs were more likely to sign a tax return containing a large and ambig-
uous deduction to retain an existing client than to gain new one.
However, tax practitioner studies tend to avoid compliance or noncompliance, directly focus-
ing instead on aggressiveness [27]. Phillips and Sansing [28] underline that conservative and 
aggressive are ex-ante labels that characterize a reporting position when the law is ambiguous. 
They go on emphasizing that taxpayer compliance is an ex-post and hypothetical concept, 
because in the real world, many of the reporting positions will not be evaluated by tax inspec-
tors. Put differently, contrary to taxpayers’ common beliefs, in many cases, tax compliance is 
not deterministic in spite of tax practitioners being involved, but it is stochastic depending on 
the enforcement activities of the tax administration.
4. The work of tax practitioners
There are a variety of motives in hiring tax practitioners. As it is, the role of tax practitio-
ners in tax compliance process can be best understood considering the multifaceted aspects 
of tax service. Frecknall-Hughes and Moizer [29] argue that the work of tax practitioners 
in its broadest way can be divided into two kinds: tax compliance and tax planning/avoid-
ance advice; the formal relates to resolve uncertainty in which tax position can be correctly 
settled, and the latter is associated with ambiguous tax situations in which legitimate tax 
position is not deterministic. Stephenson [30] discovered four separate constructs underlying 
the demands for tax practice: legal compliance, time savings, money savings, and protection 
from the tax authority.
Many taxpayers tend to claim accuracy as their main objective in tax preparation [31]. In that 
case, the quality of tax service is to ensure the tax returns do not contain inadvertent errors or 
omissions. It is somewhat evident that taxpayers hire tax practitioners to save time and effort 
required to achieve compliance. They will delegate tax return preparation to the practitioner, 
if the opportunity cost of self-reporting exceeds the service fee. Tax practitioners are also 
expected by their clients to reduce the chances of audit and penalty, thereby lowering mon-
etary and psychic costs associated with audits that would otherwise have occurred [32]. Tax 
practitioners may provide professional assurance of compliance by verifying and assessing 
acceptable tax positions in the SAS [33].
Every tax legislation, however, contains “gray” areas that produce ambiguous tax situations. 
Tax practitioners cannot get rid of entire uncertainty, but they can only gauge the likelihood 
the position not being upheld by the tax court. The tax position is subject to some uncer-
tainty and hence may step into a process of negotiation with the tax authorities [29]. Indeed, 
Frecknall-Hughes and Kirchler [34] came up with negotiation theory as a conceptual frame-
work for understanding the nature of tax practice. They argue that the tax advisor/preparer 
and the tax inspector (who are the employee of revenue authority) are negotiators who act 




trials and tax audits as revealing the truth about the matter, many practitioners approach their 
job as being able to negotiate the best settlement for their clients [35].
Some tax practitioners promote unacceptable tax minimization arrangements, assisting their 
clients in devising strategies to exploit legal ambiguities [36]. They are inclined to view test-
ing the outer limits of the tax law as a natural and acceptable feature [37]. In recent decades, 
their role has become more complicated and sophisticated with the special tax knowledge 
required to facilitate tax avoidance [38]. For example, Sikka and Hampton [39] criticize that 
accountancy firms have sold tax avoidance schemes to corporations and wealthy individuals, 
which they refer to as tax solutions or tax strategies.
Nevertheless, it is important to distinguish legally permissible tax planning from potentially 
unacceptable tax scheme. Adapting motivational postures theory [40], Kang [41] coined two 
terms indicating differentiated features of tax avoidance: deferential avoidance and defi-
ant avoidance, while deferential avoiders stand firm within the boundaries of the law, defi-
ant avoiders try to push the boundaries of the law’s intent by self-serving in terms of law 
interpretation.
The role of tax practitioners has been viewed as representative of both taxpayers and the gov-
ernment [42]. One might argue that they have to act as advocates for their clients and to serve 
as intermediaries in the tax system. Tax practitioners should be concerned not only with their 
client’s interest but also with general publics in conducting their practices. Indeed, OECD [43] 
published a report highlighting the importance of trilateral relationships among tax authori-
ties, taxpayers, and tax intermediaries in promoting taxpayer compliance. In a nutshell, tax 
practitioners have a legitimate and efficient function as intermediaries or “knowledge bro-
kers” between taxpayers and revenue authorities [44]. They can provide a useful line of com-
munication between tax inspectors and taxpayers. Furthermore, tax professionals can provide 
a check-and-balance function that prevents tax authorities’ possible extortion or tax inspec-
tors’ harassment on the part of taxpayers, thereby safeguarding the equity of a tax system [7].
There are a variety of expectations for tax practitioner work, and sometimes an “expectation 
gap” arises from the misperception of each other’s expectation. Expectations gap refers to the 
difference between client expectations and the professional’s perceptions of those expecta-
tions and vice versa [20]. Christensen [45] argues that tax preparers’ perceptions of what cli-
ents expect from tax service differ significantly from clients’ expectations. Tax preparers may 
rationalize it is their clients who demand aggressive tax reporting. Schisler [24] maintains that 
many taxpayers insist on aggressive tax advice. In contrast, according to Tan [46], taxpayers 
favor conservative tax advice if the taxpayers’ main objective is filing an accurate tax return. 
This issue is worthwhile to be explored in more depth in the following section.
5. Interactions of the taxpayer and the tax practitioner
Research on the interaction between taxpayers and tax practitioners exists much less than is 
required, providing the immense amount of time and money spent on tax compliance [20]. 
Kaplan et al. [5] emphasize the role of tax practitioners in tax compliance by demonstrating 
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that if a tax practitioner provides aggressive tax advice, the taxpayer is likely to take the aggres-
sive tax position that might not be upheld in a tax audit. On the contrary, Hite and McGill [47] 
argue that taxpayers tended to disagree with aggressive advice and to agree instead with 
conservative advice. Or, there is also evidence that conservative taxpayers defer to the opinion 
of aggressive tax practitioners [48]. Not surprisingly, there are taxpayers who will still accept 
whatever types of advice their practitioners recommend.
For the tax practitioner, clients’ risk preferences could influence the willingness of practitio-
ners to recommend aggressive positions [49]. Cloyd [50], Cuccia et al. [51], and Schisler [24] 
indicate tax practitioners’ tendency to recommend more aggressive positions when taxpayers 
are more aggressive (risk seeking). Notably, Duncan et al. [52] found the opposite evidence 
showing the more risk-averse the taxpayer, the more aggressive the tax practitioner, and the 
more aggressive the taxpayer, the more conservative tax position recommended by the prac-
titioner. Furthermore, Bobek et al. [53] examined how the role of client advocacy influenced 
tax professionals’ decision processes and outcomes and provided empirical results revealing 
that client characteristics influence tax professionals’ advocacy attitudes. These findings sug-
gest that taxpayers and tax practitioners’ decisions are interdependent, and studies on their 
interaction dynamics could be a promising approach to find new insights into tax compliance.
Wurth and Braithwaite [54] underline that practitioners are responsive to influences from 
many sources—clients, tax authorities, professional associations, governments, international 
bodies, and the organizations and cultures. For example, Doyle et al. [55] investigated the 
moral reasoning of tax practitioners in social contexts and in tax contexts, and they found 
tax practitioners’ significantly lower level moral reasoning than nonpractitioners in tax con-
texts. The study implies that client advocacy may deter tax practitioners’ moral reasoning. 
Reckers et al. [23] pointed out that less important taxpayers are more likely to receive more 
conservative advice from the tax practitioners. On the contrary, Bandy et al. [56] asserted that 
economic importance of the taxpayer had little effect on tax practitioners’ willingness to be 
aggressive in terms of providing advice or signing aggressive tax return. Spilker et al. [57] 
provide evidence that tax practitioners interpret ambiguity in the tax law differently in plan-
ning than in compliance stage because they are more vulnerable to problematic tax advice 
that might result in litigations and reputational loss.
In connection with taxpayer compliance, Practitioner-Client role model developed by Tan [58] 
recognizes two parties’ expectations, and behavioral dynamics can emphasize that how taxpay-
ers and tax practitioners interact with each others are likely to affect each other’s tax decisions. 
Similarly, The Wheel of Social Alignments put forth by Braithwaite and Wenzel [59] synthesizes 
the drivers of tax compliance regarding tax practitioners as alternative authorities to tax officials.
Some taxpayers exhibit their preference of conservative advice over aggressive one. However, 
Sakurai and Braithwaite [60] show that some taxpayers prefer “no risk no fuss” type. As with 
their diverse motivational postures [40], it is natural of taxpayers to exhibit diversity in their 
preference over tax advice as well as tax position. It is therefore in communicating with their 
clients, tax practitioners should educate, persuade, and encourage taxpayers to acknowledge 
the responsibility for their decisions in order to reduce expectation gap [61]. In many cases, 




accompanied by unintended consequences. The absence of clear communication and the fail-
ure to make reasonable enquiries when information or documentation provided by a client 
appears to be inaccurate or incomplete [62] tend to engender the disappointment in their tax 
service experienced.
Tax practitioner self-seeking behavior together with compliance cost can afford unique oppor-
tunities to explore taxpayer decision. Tax law complexity increases the cost of compliance, 
and compliance costs are widely regarded as high. For the part of taxpayers, it may seem 
unfair to hire a tax professional in order to understand the laws. Taxpayers may expect their 
compliance cost to be offset by the tax service. If they deem the service fee as a mere expense 
accompanied by no additional benefit, they will be likely to be more aggressive in order to 
restore equitable condition. For instance, Jackson et al. [63] well demonstrated how taxpayers 
and tax practitioners decisions are interrelated. Drawing on mental accounting theory, they 
postulate mental aggregation of preparation cost with taxes, and tax professionals may place 
their clients in positive prepayment positions. The concept of mental accounting derived from 
research on prospect theory describes the set of cognitive operations used by individuals to 
organize, evaluate, and keep track of financial activities [64]. Then, they provide evidence that 
tax return preparation fees are larger for taxpayers who receive tax refunds than for taxpayers 
who owe additional taxes. It is argued that compliance costs paid to the tax preparer and the 
expected tax refund occur in the same mental account. Thus, taxpayers who have a favorable 
mental representation of tax return preparation fees may be willing to pay for higher costs 
incurred by tax practitioners.
6. Conclusion
In this chapter, I attempt to distinguish tax practitioner compliance from taxpayer compliance 
for a better understanding of tax compliance process. And I maintain that tax practitioner 
behavior can be assessed in the light of tax compliance, bringing about new perspective on 
tax compliance literature. As the extent and nature of tax practice are highly relevant to tax 
compliance, it is worthwhile to investigate the meaning of tax compliance in relation to tax 
practitioner compliance behavior.
As in taxpayer compliance, tax practitioner compliance can be either inadvertent or inten-
tional. Tax practitioner noncompliance results the lack of professional competence and objec-
tivity. Nevertheless, it is somehow inevitable for them to make mistakes due in part to the 
inherent uncertainty and ambiguity of the tax legislation. In order for them to ensure compli-
ance, the tax practitioners continue to develop their professional skills; they must stay knowl-
edgeable about current tax issues that have impact, positively or negatively, on their clients. 
Furthermore, the tax practitioner should be responsive to the environment in terms of both 
what clients want as well as what tax laws allow. However, their ethical judgment based on 
professional proficiency should not be affected by client pressure.
In return for their prestige, professions have certain obligations to their clients, colleagues, and 
the society [65]. For the meaning of tax compliance must include both compliance with the 
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letter of the law and a respectful attitude toward the spirit of the law and fiscal policy [66], tax 
practitioner compliance may as well be construed in their decisions as well as underlying atti-
tudes toward clients, colleagues, and the tax system. As a service provider, the tax practitioner 
must strive to reduce inconsistencies between expectations and experiences. As a member of 
the professions, the tax practitioner refrains from abusive tax schemes that can stimulate insti-
tutional corruptions. As a professional, the tax practitioner should safeguard the integrity of 
the tax system. In short, the tax practitioners should be carefully place themselves between tax 
authority and their clients as watch dogs to maintain the integrity of the tax system.
Tax practitioners’ noncompliance, in its extreme, occurs when they ignore clients’ legitimate 
right to reduce tax dues, but in its other extreme, tax practitioner noncompliance ensues from 
their acceptance or collusion of tax evasion. It is therefore necessary for tax authorities to 
acknowledge that tax practitioners play a role of effective interventions to improve taxpayer 
compliance. Above all, the practitioners are the ones to prevent taxpayers from taking overly 
aggressive or/and illegal tax positions. Furthermore, business taxpayers and their tax practi-
tioners can be highly interdependent for tax practitioners can become business confidants [67].
There are many areas of research that have been understudied. Among them lies the conflict 
of interest between taxpayers and tax practitioner. Although the tax practitioner is hired by 
the taxpayer, they may act in accordance to their own interest rather than to the benefit of 
clients. This type of problem mostly arises from the information asymmetry between the tax-
payer and the tax practitioner. Some practitioners may take advantage of private information 
to their own merit. The conflict of interest between taxpayers and tax practitioners that is 
worthwhile to be explored to establish a complete body of tax compliance literature.
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